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Abstract
This study is the first to evaluate the setting up aid (SUA), in the Rural Development
Programme. For Sweden, we investigate if the aid, firstly, speeds up the transition
process to become manager of a farm and, secondly, affects income from farming
and survival of the farm. The approach builds on a regression discontinuity design and
explores an age 40–the eligibility requirement in the SUA. We find that the SUA has
an impact on the transition to farm management, as well as it increases income from
farming and farm survival. Consequently, the aid is likely to fulfil its aim of attracting
young people into farming.
Keywords: generational renewal, young farmers, Setting up aid, Rural Development
Programme, farm management, income from farming
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1 Introduction
The European Commission has flagged for a shortage of young farmers in
Europe (Regidor, 2012; Zagata et al., 2017), and agriculture’s generational
renewal problem is increasing (Matthew, 2018). In Sweden, the share of
farmers younger than 35 has decreased from 10 to 4 per cent between 1997
and 2015. At the same time, farmers older than 55 has increased from about
30 to over 60 per cent (see Figure 1). A shortage of young farmers may
harm the modernisation of the sector because young farmers are more likely
to be profit oriented (Gorton et al., 2008; Grubbström et al., 2014; Hamilton
et al., 2015) and to consider themselves as entrepreneurs (Gonzales and Benito,
2001; Vesala and Vesala, 2010; McDonald et al., 2014; Stenholm and Hytti,
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Fig. 1. Share of farmers aged ≤35 and ≥ 55, in Europe and Sweden, respectively, 1997–2016.
2014). Also, young farmers have stronger preferences for sustainability (Comer
et al., 1999; Vanslembrouck et al., 2002), organic farming (Lobley et al., 2009;
Laepple and Van Rensburg, 2011) and animal welfare (Mann, 2005).
The main obstacle hindering young farmers, both successors and new
entrants, to become managers of their own farm is the access to land (Regidor,
2012). In the UK. inheritance is regarded the only way to become a farmer
(Symes, 1990; Lobley, 2010). Other obstacles are low returns to farming
(Nordin et al., 2016; Nordin and Höjgård, 2019), a lack of capital assets, higher
off-farm incomes (Ahearn et al., 1985; Ahearn et al., 2006; El-Ostra et al.,
2008; Hill and Bradley, 2015), and late succession (Gale, 1994; Regidor, 2012).
As a first measure to tackle the generational renewal problem, EU introduced
early retirement schemes at the national level in the 1960s, which the Mac
Sharry CAP reform of 1992 later lifted to the EU level (EEC, 1992). Since
1981, EU Member States can choose to grant an aid to young farmers (EEC,
1972), and since 2000, the Rural Development Programme (RDP) includes a
setting up aid (SUA) (EEC, 1999). In addition, a compulsory Young Farmer
Payment was added to the first Pillar in 2015. In 2007–2020, EU has allocated
9.6 billion euro (18.3 billion euro including co-financing from Member States)
to the generation renewal project where about 70 per cent of the funding is for
the SUA and about 30 per cent is for the Young Farmer Payment (ECA, 2017).
The early retirement schemes have been found unsuccessful in increasing
the generational renewal (Mazorra, 2000; Bika, 2007; Ingram and Kirwan,
2011). To our knowledge, there has not been an empirical impact evaluation of
the SUA or the Young Farmer Payment on generational renewal. In a general
assessment of these measures, the European Court of Auditors concludes
that the policies are ‘based on a poorly defined intervention logic, with no
expected results and impact specified’ (ECA, 2017). Also, case studies of seven
Member states find that the subsidies assist ‘with capitalisation and financing
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of intergenerational succession, but is not sufficient for the establishment of a
new farming business’ (Zagata et al., 2017).
With detailed individual register data for the full population of farmers in
Sweden, merged with subsidy data for the years 1997–2015, we contribute
with new findings on the impact of the SUA.1 We investigate whether the
SUA affects, firstly, farmers’ transition process of becoming farm manager
and, secondly, income from farming, off-farm income and farm survival. We
use a regression discontinuity design (hereafter RDD) to evaluate the impact
of the SUA. The RDD differs from other pre–post group designs by its
method to assign individuals to either the treatment or the comparison group.
In RDD, assignment is made on the basis of a cut-off score on a treatment
assignment variable. Intuitively, if nothing but the probability of receiving
treatment changes at the cut-off, any jump in the conditional expectation of
the outcome variable at the cut-off can be attributed to the effects of treatment.
RDD has been described as the ‘close cousin’ of randomised experiments (Lee
and Lemieux, 2010; Dinardo and Lee, 2011).
Because a farmer has to be 40 or younger to be eligible for the SUA, a cut-
off requirement can be exploited in an RDD to estimate the causal effect of
the SUA. This cut-off provides idiosyncratic variation in the probability of
receiving the SUA as, arguably, farmers who are just eligible for the SUA
(age ≤ 40) are comparable with farmers who just missed the eligible cut-off
(age > 40). As the validity of the RDD hinges on the existence of a cut-off
effect, we precede the results and show that such a cut-off is present in our
data (see Figure 2, which we will return to in more detail later). At the age
of the subsidy requirement, the probability of taking managerial control of a
farm (among persons with a background as hired2 farmers) drops: at age 40,
the probability decreases with almost 2 percentage points (or around 25 per
cent).
The succession of a farm is related to the incumbent farmer’s (often the
parent’s) retirement decision. Research shows that the relationship between
the incumbent farmer’s age and the timing of succession is nonlinear (Glauben
et al., 2009)3. A late succession is, therefore, likely determined by both
unobserved farm and farmer characteristics, affecting also the post-transition
business performance and income from the farming. Consequently, the age-40
cut-off effect may be biased if a late transition also captures unobserved factors
1 The Young Farmer Payment is included in Pillar I from 2015 but has no observed impact on our
results. That is, if we exclude 2015 from the study period the results do not change.
2 It is reported that prospective successors often work as a hired worker before the farm transition
takes place (Errington and Lobley 2002; Uchiyama et al., 2008; Lobley, 2010). However, we do
not know if the hired worker is a family member, non-family member or a part of the extended
family. As a hired worker, the successor may be involved in the management of the farm but the
incumbent farmer often fails to involve the successor in the financial management of the farm
(Chiswell, 2016).
3 Others to study the relationship between transition and age is Kimhi (1994), who finds that
parents transfer the farms earlier when the age differential between the parent and the child
is large, and Mishra et al. (2010) find that the probability of having a succession plan increases
with the age of the farm operator.
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Fig. 2. Probability of taking managerial control of a farm for hired workers (in the years 1998–2015)
for each age from 26 to 50. Shaded lines show 95 per cent coefficient intervals.
(see Burton, 2006 for a discussion on age as an indicator). However, a correct
modelling of the assignment variable in an RDD (in our case, the age of the
prospective successor) on both side of the cut-off implies an unbiased cut-off
effect (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). So, if age is an important determinant of both
farm succession and the post-transition business performance, conditioning on
the prospective successor’s age solves the problem.
This study reveals that the SUA has a significant impact on the transition
to farm management. It also shows a very large drop in incomes when a
hired farmer becomes farm manager. To our knowledge, the literature has not
analysed the impact of gaining management control of a farm on income from
farming for hired workers; consequently, the finding of a large negative impact
is new. Though we are not able to explain the fall in income, we document that
the SUA subsidy mitigates its fall. Affecting both the timing of the succession
and post-succession incomes, the SUA is likely to contribute to a generational
renewal of the sector. A back-of-the envelope calculation shows that farmers
become managers 1.1 years earlier with the SUA. Yet, the finding of a large
drop in incomes after the transition (also for SUA receivers) indicates that
the current policy only mitigates rather than solving the generational renewal
problem.
2 The generational renewal problem in Sweden and
Europe
Figure 1 illustrates how the generational renewal problem has developed over
time by reporting the share of farmers that are (i) younger than 35 and (ii)
older than 55. These two thresholds are set by Eurostat, and following their
reporting has become standard in the literature. Apart from Eurostat’s findings
for Sweden and Europe as a whole, we add own calculations for Sweden based
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on our data. As the cut-off for receiving a generational renewal subsidy is
40, an unfortunate difference between statistics and policy exists (Zagata and
Sutherland, 2015). Eurostat’s statistics reports the shares for the period 2005–
2016, while our data go back until 1997. According to Eurostat’s statistics, the
shortage of young farmers is larger in Sweden than in Europe: the share below
35 and the share above 55 is smaller and larger in Sweden than in Europe,
respectively. The numbers for Sweden based on our data show a higher share
of older farmers than in the Eurostat statistics (mainly in the end of the period),
suggesting that the ‘demographic gap’ in Sweden might be even larger than
previously known.4 However, this difference may be due to different setups in
the two datasets. Eurostat classifies farmers as a ‘sole holder’ of an agriculture
holding, while there could be more than one holder in our data, contributing
mainly to a higher number of older farmers. Moreover, our longer period for
Sweden contributes by showing similar trends before and after 2005. Note also
that the kink around 2005, and the relatively high share of old farmers in 2005–
2007, is due to the decoupling reform.5
3 Data and descriptive analysis
3.1 The data set
The data comes from the Longitudinal Integration Database for Health
Insurance and Labour Market Studies (LISA), which includes all individuals
16 years of age and older, registered in Sweden as of December 31 each year.
The sample we start off with is a panel containing everyone who has ever
worked in agriculture over the period 1997–2015. For each year, an industry
code6 determines who received farming incomes from work or business. We
then merged this data with subsidy data from the Swedish Board of Agriculture
for the period 2000–2015.
Next, we restrict the sample to prospective successors. First, we select
individuals who has worked as a hired farmer for at least 1 year during 1997–
2015, so that all potential transitions to farm management during the period
can be observed, i.e. individuals who start of as managers are not included
in the sample. The transition to become a farm manager is identified from
information describing if the individual is a manager of a sole proprietorship
or a corporation in agriculture. Managers of both types of juridical bodies
are eligible for the SUA. The individual does not necessarily has to be a sole
4 When compared to the total Swedish population, we see that the changes for farmers are partly
(but merely to a minor extent) due to general changes in demographics. For example, during
1997–2016, the share ≤35 decreased with 8% in the farming population, while it only decreased
with 1% in the total population
5 In 2004 (when farmers could apply for the decoupled single farm payments for the first time),
retired individuals who still had some agricultural land was classified as farmers. A change in
2007, requiring that the land holding was a minimum of four hectares, substantially decreased
the number of registered farmers.
6 The Swedish Standard Industrial Classification (SNI) code is identical to the classification of
economic activities in the European Community (NACE).
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holder, and there could be more than one holder/manager of a farm.7 Second,
as the RDD analysis compare people around the cut-off age of 40, we remove
individuals far from the cut-off, ≤25 and ≥ 50, who are less comparable.
Individuals younger than 26 may still be investing in (agricultural) education
and individuals older than 50 are no longer likely to become managers. Third,
the individual is removed from the sample when leaving farming.
We follow individuals over time, both before and after the transition to
become manager. The pooled number of farmers across time—both hired
workers and farm managers—is 32,183 and the average yearly sample of
farmers is 7,384. About 9.7 per cent of the hired workers transit to management
each year.
Apart from the probability of becoming farm manager, the other two
outcome variables are incomes and farm survival. Incomes in the LISA dataset
are collected from tax records and include farmer’s individual incomes from
work or business. Based on industry codes, we determine (for up to five income
sources) if the income is from farming or another sector (off-farm income).
Thus, unlike most other studies analysing farm income, we use individual
gross income (before income tax is deducted but after corporate- and payroll
taxes are deducted), and not, e.g. farm family income, which is measured at
the farm/family level (before taxes). Using individual incomes probably has a
small impact on the result, because in Sweden, only spouse contributes with
about 15 per cent of the total households’ farm incomes (Nordin and Höjgård,
2019). Farm survival is defined as having remained as a farmer 5 years after
the transition to farm management.
The dataset provides a set of covariates that we use as control variables
along with farm-level and calendar year fixed effects. The covariate years of
schooling, gender, and if the farmer has an education in farming8 are known
to affect outcomes such as income and survival. Table 1 report descriptive
statistics for the variables used in this study.
For the descriptive regression analysis in the next section, we add subsidy
data measured at the firm level to our individual-level sample. For 38.5 per cent
of the subsidies, we are not able to identify a receiver; therefore, some receivers
are classified as non-receivers9. This caveat, is, however, not a problem for our
main analysis, because RDD identifies the subsidy effect from the age cut-
off at 40 (which we describe in the next section) and not from the subsidy
information, per se.
7 To make sure that the business management is within agriculture and not some other activity,
we have to restrict the sample to farmers with a main income from farming. This is not a problem
because individuals without a main income from farming are very unlikely to become managers
and receive the SUA; to be eligible for the SUA, a basic requirement is that you are a committed
farmer. Thus, even if they may become managers, they are not likely to receive the SUA.
8 The educational variables are constructed from The Swedish Education Terminology (SUN),
which is adapted to the international terminology International Standard Classification of
Education 1997 (ISCED 97).
9 Also, to determine the timing of the subsidy is somewhat problematic. In the data, the application
year is often different from the disbursement year, and neither corresponds with the year the
individual transits to a manager position.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of outcomes and covariate
Mean Standard deviation
Farm managers (%) 8.42 0.278
T ≤ 40 (%) 62.80 0.483
Age 37.46 7.24
Years of schooling 11.7 1.86
Education in farming (%) 47.7 0.499
Women (%) 26.4 0.441
Year 2005.8 5.16
Ln farm income 7.38 0.867
Ln off-farm income 2.56 2.68




Another potential data drawback is that we cannot explore the transition
into agriculture for individuals who enter farming from outside and has not
worked as a hired worker before they become managers.10 However, this group
is probably very unlikely to receive the SUA, because it requires (apart from
being younger than 41) that the ‘farmer [ . . . ] possesses adequate occupational
skills and competence’11, and if you never worked as a hired worker, you
probably lack adequate farming skills. Also, we cannot tell from the data if the
transition is a succession, but we assume that most transitions are. In Sweden,
family members are contracted as hired workers, but we do not know if the
hired workers are family members, extended family members (e.g. sons-in-
law) or non-family members (see footnote 2). Nevertheless, this should not
be a problem because remuneration to family members without a contract is
illegal. Also, due to a general tax deduction of Swedish Kronor (SEK) 18,000,
there are tax reasons to pay wages to young hired family members. Prospective
hired successors should therefore be in our study sample.
3.2 Pre- and post-transition incomes in a descriptive
regression analysis
With a descriptive analysis of the economic impact of becoming a farm
manager, we pinpoint a potential bias in the comparison of individuals with and
without an SUA subsidy, a bias which the RDD methodology aims to solve.
We look at the individuals’ income from farming longitudinally by regressing
10 Anyone who worked as a hired farmer are included, even those who did not grew up on a
farm. The definition of new entrants is not clear (Zagata et al., 2017) as it could either refer to a
successor taking over the family farm or to someone who begins farming (and did not grew up
on a farm).
11 European Commission Regulation No. 1305/2014, Article 2 paragraph n.
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Fig. 3. Longitudinal analysis where we follow individuals’ income from farming over time; before and
after getting managerial control of a farm.
income on a set of pre- and post-transition dummies. To remove a positive
trend in individual incomes due to increasing experience and consequent better
farming skills, we control for age and age squared. In addition, we remove a
general increase in income equal to all farmers with a set of year dummies
(Nordin and Höjgård, 2019). For this analysis, we do not have to know when the
subsidy is received. Assuming that the SUA is received close to the transition
to management is enough. The result of this exercise is shown in Figure 3,
separately for subsidy receivers and non-receivers. We use the first period in
time (7 years prior to becoming a manager) as the reference. However, as the
subsidy receivers are underreported, the comparison of SUA receivers and non-
receivers has to be done with caution. A correct classification of SUA receivers
and non-receivers may change the result. It could be that the incomes of non-
receivers is biased in the direction of the receivers (so that the true gap in
income between the receivers and the non-receives is larger than observed in
Figure 3), but it could also be the opposite.
The figure shows a significant penalty (i.e. the fall in income between year
−1 and 0) of transiting from a hired farmer to a farm manager that possibly is
related both to transition and investment costs and to postponed income. The
penalty in year zero is smaller for farmers who receive the SUA: around SEK
20,000 and 40,000 (aboute2,000 ande4,000) for those with and without SUA,
respectively. These penalties in absolute values correspond to 12.5 and 25 per
cent. The smaller drop in income for SUA receivers appear to persist over time,
as farmers who received the SUA have higher incomes than non-receivers, up
to 15 years after the transition to farm management.
Notice, before the transition the income falls with SEK 15,000. Precisely
why this is so unclear, but certain pre-transition costs are probably an expla-
nation. It could also be due to how the data are reported. In the data, firm
management is reported in November and for farmers who become managers
late during the year the timing of the transition is mismeasured.
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To sum up, the smaller income penalty in the group who receives the SUA
indicates an impact. The long-run differences between receivers and non-
receivers implies that it is not merely a direct impact of the monetary transfer,
but probably also an indirect effect on management, plausibly on investment
decisions, etc. However, the effect could also be due to selection in the uptake
of aid, as indicated by the small difference in income already in the early
periods prior to transition. For example, because a solid business plan and an
education in agriculture are required for receiving the aid, SUA receivers are
likely to differ compared to other farmers transitioning to farm management.
In addition, our subsidy data contain a measurement error that might bias
the effect. To handle the selection problem and the measurement error in the
subsidy data, we use the RDD approach, which by its design aims to estimate
a causal subsidy effect.
4 Empirical strategy
4.1 The starting point—a naïve individual fixed effect model
To explain and build the formal representation of the RDD model, we start
by presenting a simple naïve individual fixed effect model e.g. income from
farming and gradually work our way towards the more complex RDD model
for estimating the cut-off effect on income from farming on the probability of
becoming farm manager at age 4012. The naïve model for income estimates
the impact of the transition to farm management, M for individual i, on income
from farming, Y, in year t:
Yit = αi + δt + β0Mit + β1SUAit + γ X + εit (1)
where αi and δt are individual and year fixed effect, respectively. β0 is the
income effect of gaining management control (represented by the indicator
variable M, M = 1 after transition). γ are the effects of a set of covariates, X,
i.e. observable characteristics affecting the outcome and SUA (including age).
The subsidy indicator variable, SUA13, captures the impact, β1, of the subsidy.
According to Figure 3, β1 is positive due to the smaller drop in income for
subsidy receivers than for non-receivers. However, selection in uptake is likely
and we also have the problem with measurement errors in the subsidy data.
Consequently, this model is not estimated. Still, this naïve model is informative
as it helps us to understand the more complicated RDD model.
12 Because the section focuses on selection issues, we start by presenting the model for analysing
the effect of management (with and without SUA) before presenting the model for analysing the
effect of SUA on becoming manager.
13 Note that SUA is a subset of M because SUA is conditional on transfer to management.






/erae/article/47/5/1697/5814077 by Sveriges Iantbruksuniversitet user on 18 January 2021
4.2 RDD model of income from farming, off-farm income and
farm survival
RDD is a quasi-experimental method where the researcher assigns individuals
to the treatment or the control group on the basis of a single assignment
variable (in this case age) with a specified cut-off value (age ≤ 40). Even though
the assignment is not randomised, selection is not causing the assignment
as in the naïve model above where SUA receivers are compared to non-
receivers. By comparing the outcome in the treatment group (age ≤ 40) to
the counterfactual outcome in the control group (>40), we can estimate the
treatment effect without observing who actually gets the treatments (SUA).
The intuition behind the RDD is that individuals around the cut-off are very
similar, not just in age, but also in other observed and unobserved ways. In
an RDD, manipulation of the cut-off is instead a problem, but section 4.4 will
alleviate this concern.
Figure 2 revealed a clear cut-off effect in the probability of becoming farm
manager at age 40. We exploit this cut-off as the age eligibility requirement
in the RDD. Formally, SUA is the treatment and the time-varying continuous
variable age, A, is the assignment variable. An individual is eligible for the
subsidy if A ≤ 40 (indicated by a dummy variable, T≤40, which equals one after
turning 40) but, as this is merely an eligibility requirement and not the treatment
status, we replace SUA in equation (1) with Mit × T≤40 in equation (2):
Yit = αi + δt + β0Mit + β1Mij × T≤40 + f (A) + γ X + εit (2)
where Yit is either income from farming, off-farm income or farm survival.
Mit × T≤40 describes that the individual has taken management control and has
potentially received a SUA. Because treatment status is a stochastic function
of age, and not a deterministic one, it qualifies as a fuzzy rather than a sharp
RDD. Consequently, β1 gives the reduced form estimate of the cut-off effect,
i.e. a weighted effect for SUA receivers and non-receivers. Thus, β1answers if
those who become managers before 41 are affected differently by this transition
compared to those who become managers at 41 or later. This cut-off effect is
attributed to the SUA. By weighting β1 with the share of subsidy receivers in
the farm population (about 52 per cent of those who gain management control
when younger than 41)14, we get the treatment effect on the treated. f (A) is a
low-order polynomial of A (the assignment variable)15, modelled separately on
both sides of the cut-off. This approach is non-parametric and is often called
local linear regression.
It is standard to estimate a RDD model with different bandwidth (i.e. the
age intervals before and after the cut-off) and with different polynomials of
14 Subsidy receivers to population who gain management control before the age of 40.
15 With a discrete assignment variable, a recent study by Kolesár and Rothe (2018) shows that it is
not recommended to cluster the standard errors on the assignment variable; robust standards
errors are preferred. Their finding is generated from a similar research design as ours where an
age-40 treatment effect is estimated on wages.
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A. To avoid estimating a treatment effect caused by nonlinearities in A, a
small interval (bandwidth) around the cut-off point is recommended (Hahn
et al., 2001; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). We use the ages 26–50 and 30–45
as bandwidths, and linear and quadratic polynomials. Parametric regression,
where the full sample is used, does not change the result.
4.3 Model of the probability of transition
In addition to the different measures of income and farm survival, we study if
the age-40 cut-off affects the farmer’s probability of becoming manager (i.e.
an econometric modelling of Figure 2). The model is an adaptation of equation
(2):
Mit = δt + β1T≤40 + f (A) + γ X + εit (3)
where M is the outcome variable and therefore not interacted with T≤40. β1
answers if individuals are more (or less) likely to become managers before
rather than after the age of 41; i.e. if the SUA affects the transition probability.
4.4 Does the RDD assumptions hold?
The RDD assumes that individuals are, conditional on A, randomly distributed
as farm managers around A40. If this assumption holds, then the design ensures
that those who just barely received the SUA are comparable to those who just
barely did not. To assess randomness in assignment around the cut-off, Lee
and Lemieux (2010) recommend a histogram of the assignment variable to
look for bunching around the cut-off. Such bunching is a strong indication
of manipulation of the assignment variable, meaning that individuals have
influenced whether or not they made the cut-off to become treated. In our case,
it seems plausible to expect bunching if more foresighted farmers consider
the SUA eligibility requirement and, thereby, become farm managers earlier,
before turning 41. Bunching could also be the result of an optimal transfer
date (see Kimhi, 1994). However, Figure 4, a histogram of age when becoming
manager shows no indication of bunching in frequency at age 40.
A formal test for bunching is proposed by McCrary (2008). This test, first,
computes the frequencies for each bin (each age) and, second, estimates a
regression of the (logarithmic) frequencies on a cut-off indicator variable
(when controlling for A). Table 216 reports a small and insignificant McCrary
test statistic. Thus, farmers do not appear to speed up the transition to farm
management and selection is therefore rejected.
A balancing test analyses if there is a jump in background factors at the cut-
off; i.e. if farmers around the cut-off are different. Table 2 tests for discontinuity
around 40 for gender, year of schooling and farm education. For farm education
and gender, a discontinuity around 40 is not found. For years of schooling, it
16 For the tests in this section, we use model 2 in Table 3 with one polynomial of A; which we
consider our preferred model.
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Fig. 4. Histogram of the farmers’ age when transitioning to farm management.





T≤40 0.0015 0.199∗∗∗ 0.0269
(0.0157) (0.0675) (0.0232)
Observations 11,190 11,175 11,190
R-squared 0.011 0.059 0.052
McCrary test (estimate of A = 40) 1.391
(10.75)
Note: The models are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The dependent variables in the upper panels
are farmer characteristics measured at the age of transition to farm management. In the McCrary test, the dependent
variable is the frequencies of age at transition to farm management. Linear age polynomials are included separately
above and under the cut-off.
∗∗∗Significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors.
is more unclear: we find a small but significant cut-off effect of 0.2 (i.e. at
the cut-off, the difference in schooling is 0.2 years). However, this difference
is not problematic as we control for years of schooling,17 but it may indicate
selection on other characteristics as well. Nevertheless, when considering both
the McCrary test and the differences in background factors, we conclude that
selection around 40 is a minor problem and any potential selection will be
removed by the individual fixed effects and the covariates in the RDD model.
5 RDD results
5.1 Probability of transition
Beginning with the probability of transition, Table 3 presents results from
equation (3)—the age-40 cut-off effect on farm management. Columns (1)
17 The fixed effects control for between individual differences in education and the years of
schooling variable control for individual changes in years of schooling over time.
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Table 3. Estimated age-40 cut-off effect on farm management
(1) (2) (3) (4)
T≤40 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.00616 0.0205∗∗∗
(0.00271) (0.00271) (0.00387) (0.00344)
Bandwidth 26–50 26–50 26–50 30–45
Polynomials 1 1 2 1
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.040 0.040 0.043 0.039
Observations 132,929 132,929 132,929 84,348
Individuals 32,183 32,183 32,183 22,255
Note: The models are estimated with OLS. The dependent variable is the farm management. Covariates include years
of schooling, education in farming and year dummies.
∗∗∗Significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors.
and (2) include a linear age control (modelled separately on either side of
the cut-off) and in column (3), we add squared age. In columns (1)–(3), we
use the ages 26–50 as our bandwidth and in column (4), we use a smaller
bandwidth of 30–45. The cut-off effect is 2.1 percentage points in columns
(1)–(2) and (4), showing that hired workers younger than 41 are around
25 per cent (calculated at the mean probability of transitioning to farm
management) more likely to take management control compared to hired
workers older than 40. We find no effect when including quadratic age in
column (3). This finding is in line with Figure 2 were age appears to affect the
probability lineally, and when including quadratic age, we probably remove
the effect by introducing to many age controls on a few number of bins.
Our impression from Figure 2 and the estimated cut-off effect are that the
eligibility requirement of the SUA, undeniably, affects the probability of farm
management. Nevertheless, the SUA effect could overlap with an optimal
transfer date effect, but this is unlikely because the assignment variable and
age should capture such an effect.
It is difficult to assess the impact of the SUA on the age structure, i.e.
how much the SUA rejuvenates the farming population. Using the estimated
(from Table 3, column 2) change in transition probability due to the SUA, we
do a back-of-the-envelope calculation18, which shows that average age when
taking managerial control of a farm decreases with 1.1 years. However, this
calculation does not take into account the change in age structure for those
above 40.
5.2 Income from farming, off-farm income and farm survival
Next, we estimate equation (2) for income from farming, off-farm income and
farm survival. Table 4 reports results that are in line with the finding in Figure
18 For each age group in our study population (26–51), we use the true number of farm managers,
and the predicted number of farm managers without the SUA, to calculate the average age of
managers with and without the SUA. To predict the number of farm managers without the SUA,
we use the SUA effect to document the change in probability for each age group.
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Table 4. Estimated age-40 cut-off effect on income from farming, off-farm income and farm
survival








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
M −0.111∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.0730∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0158) (0.0428) (0.0165)
M∗ T≤40 0.0500∗∗ 0.0532∗∗ 0.0473 −0.252∗∗∗ 0.0508 0.0421∗
(0.0247) (0.0248) (0.0305) (0.0775) (0.0312) (0.0228)
Bandwidth 26–50 26–50 30–45 26–50 26–50 26–50
Polynomials 1 2 1 1 1 1
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.087 0.087 0.065 0.013 0.738 0.065
Observations 132,929 132,929 84,348 132,929 103,904 7757
Individuals 32,183 32,183 22,255 32,183 25,374 7757
Note: The models are estimated with OLS. The dependent variables are logarithmic income from farming (1)–(3),
logarithmic off-farm income (4), farm survival (5) and logarithmic income from farming 5 years after transitioning to
farm management (6). Farmer fixed effects are included in (1)–(5). Covariates include years of schooling, education
in farming and year dummies.
∗Significant at 10% level. Robust standard errors.
∗∗Significant at 5% level.
∗∗∗Significant at 1% level.
3: a negative impact of farm management on income from farming of 0.11
percentage points (columns 1–3). For individuals younger than 41, the effect is
counteracted by a cut-off effect of around 0.05, which we interpret as a positive
impact of the SUA. Neither a smaller bandwidth nor an increased number of
polynomials impacts the size of the effect (see columns 2 and 3), but a smaller
bandwidth increases the standard errors, turning the effect insignificant. We
weight the reduced form estimate in Table 4 with the share of managers with the
SUA (about 52 per cent of those who gain management control when younger
than 41) to receive the average effect for the treated instead of the average
effect of the potentially treated.19 This estimate is 9.7 (0.05/0.52) percentage
points, meaning that the net impact of farm management for subsidy receivers
is almost zero (9.7–11).20
Turning to column (4), we find that management decreases off-farm income,
particularly for subsidy receivers. Because off-farm incomes are low on aver-
age, small absolute changes imply large relative changes (and farm manage-
ment often implies an end to an off-farm engagement).
19 Like in instrument variable estimation, the IV-estimate is
Reduced form estimate
First stage estimate .
20 We cannot visualize the cut-off effect on income from farming, even if it is standard to do so.
Without a control for management, M, the cut-off effect captures the net effect of management
(which is negative on income from farming) and the subsidy effect (which is positive on income
from farming).
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Table 5. Estimating placebo cut-off effects when assuming age eligibility cut-offs of 35
or 37
Farm management Income from farming
Age ≤ 35 Age ≤ 37 Age ≤ 35 Age ≤ 37
A≤35 or 37 −0.0015 −0.0057∗∗
(0.00289) (0.00289)
M∗A≤35 or 37 0.0184 0.0066
(0.0245) (0.0247)
Bandwidth 26–50 26–50 26–50 26–50
Polynomials 1 1 1 1
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 132,929 132,929 132,929 132,929
R-squared 0.042 0.041 0.086 0.086
Number of Persons 32,183 32,183 32,183 32,183
Note: The models are estimated with OLS. The dependent variables are farm management and logarithmic income
from farming. Farmer fixed effects are included in columns (3)–(4). Covariates include years of schooling, education
in farming and year dummies.
∗∗Significant at 5% level.
∗Significant at 10% level. Robust standard errors.
As a next step, we estimate the SUA effect on income from farming 5 years
after transition (column 5) and farm survival (column 6). We use the same
specification as in column (1).21 We find that the cut-off effect on income from
farming in year 5 is similar to the effect in year 0 (but insignificant due to larger
standard errors), while the general impact of farm management has turned
positive. Finally, the results, in column (6), show that farmers who receive the
SUA have a higher probability of surviving as farmers22.
5.3 Placebo test
One way of testing the accuracy of the results is to execute a placebo test. For
farm management and income from farming, we model the age eligibility cut-
off to be 35 and 37 instead of 40. Table 5 reports these placebo cut-off effects.
For farm management, we find a small cut-off effect at age 37 (about a fourth of
the effect at age 40). But, the overall finding from the placebo analysis supports
our empirical strategy as the incorrect assignment of individuals to treatment
and comparison groups provide insignificant estimates.
6 Conclusions
Our results indicate that the SUA mitigates the generational renewal problem.
We find that the age-40 eligibility requirement of the SUA has a significant
21 The other two specifications provide similar results (not reported).
22 Because farm survival is conditional on having become manager, the sample is much smaller as
non-managers and the panel dimension are lost.
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impact on the transition to become farm manager. A higher probability of
transitioning before age 41 likely decreases the average age of farm managers.
Moreover, we document a fall in income when transitioning to farm manager
that the SUA mitigates, both in the short and long run. The aid also increases
the probability of farm survival. The long-run impact indicates that the SUA
affects investments, for example, through returns to investments or through
reducing borrowed capital, lowering the interest costs. At the same time, the
SUA decreases off-farm income, possibly because farm management competes
with other engagements.
Since EU recently added the Young Farmer Payment, which is similar to
the SUA, it is important to discuss whether the results may apply also to the
Young Farmer Payment. Like the SUA, the Young Farmer Payment has an age-
40 requirement, but it is paid out for 5 years after taking over or starting up a
farm. As it is included in the first pillar, the payments is general and based on
hectares of agricultural land.
We argue that the SUA is more likely to increase generation renewal than
the Young Farmer Payment. First, as everyone aged 40 or younger is eligible
for the Young Farmer Payment, it probably has lower precision than the SUA.
Second, to receive the SUA, the farmer has to produce a business plan, which
obliges the farmer to elaborate on the future and how to develop the farm. The
SUA may, therefore, part from having a monetary impact, encourage change
and well-thought-out management. Finally, as we find a large fall in incomes at
the transition date, a lump sum may better stimulate investments than spreading
the payments over 5 years. Taken together, these reasons suggest that EU may
want to give priority to the SUA as a policy for targeting generational renewal.
7 Conclusion
Whether the SUA affects the probability of becoming a farm manager for young
hired farmers, and not only becoming manager sooner rather than later, cannot
be empirically analysed in this setting. Nevertheless, as the SUA reduces the
transition age and increases income from farming, the aid appears to make
farming more attractive for young people. This study, therefore, concludes
that the aid is likely to fulfil its aim of increasing the share of young persons
in farming. Some words of caution are still warranted. Even if generational
renewal probably will modernise the sector and contribute to continued farm
survival, it may also have adverse consequences as an increased inflow of
young farmers may decrease the ongoing structural change; i.e. it may imply
fewer large and competitive farms in the long run.
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